Contracting for information: on the effects of the principal's outside option
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More about this item
Keywords
Communication; Mechanism Design; Outside option; Transfers;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2017-04-09 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2017-04-09 (Microeconomics)
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