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Corruption driven by imitative behavior

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  • Accinelli, Elvio
  • Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez

Abstract

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Accinelli, Elvio & Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez, 2012. "Corruption driven by imitative behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 84-87.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:84-87
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schlag, Karl H., 1999. "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 493-522, May.
    2. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    3. Philippe Aghion, 2005. "Growth and Institutions," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 3-18, March.
    4. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521480444, November.
    5. Wydick,Bruce, 2008. "Games in Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521867580, January.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    7. Mishra, Ajit, 2006. "Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 349-358, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Elvio Accinelli & Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera, 2014. "Corrupción, desigualdad y evasión de impuestos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0514, Department of Economics - dECON.
    2. Accinelli, Elvio, 2015. "Instituciones, economía clásica y economía evolutiva," Panorama Económico, Escuela Superior de Economía, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, vol. 0(21), pages 7-26, julio-dic.
    3. Gen-Fu Feng & Bo Sui & Min-Yi Dong & Chun-xia Jiang & Chun-Ping Chang, 2018. "Border is better than distance? Contagious corruption in one belt one road economies," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 1909-1928, July.
    4. Elena Gubar & Edgar Javier Sanchez Carrera & Suriya Kumacheva & Ekaterina Zhitkova & Galina Tomilina, 2018. "Games and Network Structures on Corruption, Income Inequality, and Tax Control," Working Papers 1808, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2018.
    5. Victor H. ROSAS-MARTINEZ, 2016. "On Behavioral Macroeconomics, Globalization, and Economic Growth," Journal of Economics Bibliography, KSP Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 482-489, September.
    6. Jandhyala, Srividya & Oliveira, Fernando S., 2021. "The role of international anti-corruption regulations in promoting socially responsible practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 15-32.
    7. Rosas-Martinez, Victor H., 2016. "Expectations Over Durable Assets: How to Avoid the Formation of Value Bubbles," MPRA Paper 75350, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Bo Sui & Gen-Fu Feng & Chun-Ping Chang, 2018. "The pioneer evidence of contagious corruption," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 945-968, March.
    9. Daniel Gingerich & Virginia Oliveros & Ana Corbacho & Mauricio Ruiz-Vega, 2015. "Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 88334, Inter-American Development Bank.
    10. Elvio Accinelli & Osvaldo Salas, 2019. "El estado de bienestar como un bien público no excluible / The welfare state as a public good not excludable," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 34(2), pages 243-273.
    11. W. C. Abram & K. Noray, 2018. "Political Corruption and Public Activism: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-21, March.
    12. Stojanovikj, Martin, 2022. "Can inflation targeting reduce price information asymmetry and alleviate corruptive behavior? Evidence from developing countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(3).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corrupt behavior; Evolutionary dynamics; Imitative behavior; Institutions and operations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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