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Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence using actual health expenditure risk

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  • Johar, Meliyanni
  • Savage, Elizabeth

Abstract

In a market where insurers are not allowed to risk rate, we find evidence of advantageous selection using observed health expenditure risk. Selection is driven by income and optimism about the future. This may explain insurers’ profitability, despite community rating.

Suggested Citation

  • Johar, Meliyanni & Savage, Elizabeth, 2012. "Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence using actual health expenditure risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 579-582.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:579-582
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bolhaar, Jonneke & Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2012. "A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 669-690.
    2. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2008. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 303-350, April.
    3. Lee, Yong-Woo, 2012. "Asymmetric information and the demand for private health insurance in Korea," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 284-287.
    4. Coelho, Marta & de Meza, David, 2012. "Do bad risks know it? Experimental evidence on optimism and adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 168-171.
    5. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2011. "Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 115-138, Winter.
    6. Denise Doiron & Glenn Jones & Elizabeth Savage, 2008. "Healthy, wealthy and insured? The role of self‐assessed health in the demand for private health insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 317-334, March.
    7. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Johar, Meliyanni, 2015. "Obesity and health expenditures: Evidence from Australia," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 42-58.
    2. Denise Doiron & Nathan Kettlewell, 2020. "Family formation and the demand for health insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 523-533, April.
    3. Ha Trong Nguyen & Huong Thu Le & Luke Connelly & Francis Mitrou, 2023. "Accuracy of self‐reported private health insurance coverage," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(12), pages 2709-2729, December.
    4. Lan Nguyen & Andrew C. Worthington, 2023. "Moral hazard in Australian private health insurance: the case of dental care services and extras cover," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(1), pages 157-176, January.
    5. Nathan Kettlewell, 2020. "Policy Choice and Product Bundling in a Complicated Health Insurance Market: Do People Get It Right?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 55(2), pages 566-610.
    6. Normann Lorenz, 2014. "Adverse selection and heterogeneity of demand responsiveness," Research Papers in Economics 2014-02, University of Trier, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health insurance; Health expenditure risk; Adverse selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

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