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An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

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  • Kratzsch, Uwe
  • Sieg, Gernot
  • Stegemann, Ulrike

Abstract

Greenhouse gas emissions build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. We identify weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria with full participation in a game of international emission reduction. Treaties are easier to reach for long-lived than for short-lived gases.

Suggested Citation

  • Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2012. "An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 473-476.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:473-476
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Scott Barrett, 2002. "Consensus Treaties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 529-547, December.
    2. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
    3. Geir Asheim & Bjart Holtsmark, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(4), pages 519-533, August.
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    5. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2008. "Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 360-394, August.
    6. Evans, Robert & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 361-369, December.
    7. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2007. "Public Policies against Global Warming," NBER Working Papers 13454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy, 2009. "A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 187-209, August.
    9. Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2010. "A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R & D," MPRA Paper 27188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon, 2008. "A climate agreement with full participation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 317-319, May.
    11. Scott Barrett, 1999. "A Theory of Full International Cooperation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(4), pages 519-541, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nyborg, Karine, 2018. "Reciprocal climate negotiators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 707-725.
    2. Nyborg, Karine, 2014. "Reciprocal Climate Negotiators: Balancing Anger against Even More Anger," Memorandum 17/2014, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    3. Jon Hovi & Hugh Ward & Frank Grundig, 2015. "Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 665-688, December.
    4. Günther, Michael & Hellmann, Tim, 2017. "International environmental agreements for local and global pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 38-58.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Global warming; International agreement; Weak renegotiation-proofness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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