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International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis

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  • Takashima, Nobuyuki

Abstract

Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.

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  • Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2017. "International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 312-320.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:61:y:2017:i:c:p:312-320
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.10.011
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    4. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2018. "International environmental agreements between asymmetric countries: A repeated game analysis," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 38-44.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international environmental agreements; subgame perfect equilibrium; renegotiation-proof; repeated game; ancillary benefits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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