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The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions

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  • Martínez-Pardina, Irene
  • Romeu, Andrés

Abstract

We show that a multiple-unit descending-price auction in which the clock is not reset after each sale may be faster and yield more stable prices than an efficient alternative, thus providing sellers a rationale for using it in practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Martínez-Pardina, Irene & Romeu, Andrés, 2011. "The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 310-313.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:3:p:310-313
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 1988. "Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 15-19.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gretschko, Vitali & Rasch, Alexander & Wambach, Achim, 2014. "On the strictly descending multi-unit auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 79-85.
    2. Philippe Gillen & Alexander Rasch & Achim Wambach & Peter Werner, 2016. "Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 511-534, November.
    3. Fabian Ocker, 2018. "“Bid more, pay less” – overbidding and the Bidder’s curse in teleshopping auctions," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 28(4), pages 491-508, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-unit descending-price sequential auctions; Numeric methods; Euler algorithm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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