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Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain

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  • Merrill, Lauren Nicole

Abstract

If the number of individuals is odd, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of linear orders that admit a Condorcet winner (Campbell and Kelly, 2003). This paper shows that the claim is false when the number of individuals is even, and provides a counterpart to the theorem for the even case.

Suggested Citation

  • Merrill, Lauren Nicole, 2011. "Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 259-261, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:3:p:259-261
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, April.
    2. Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2000. "A simple characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 689-700.
    3. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2006. "Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 81-89, January.
    4. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2015. "Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 79-82.
    2. Powers, Robert C. & Wells, Flannery, 2023. "Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 42-49.
    3. Felix Brand & Patrick Lederer & Sascha Tausch, 2023. "Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains," Papers 2302.12140, arXiv.org.

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