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Social aggregators

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  • Kfir Eliaz

Abstract

This paper proposes a general framework for analyzing a class of functions called social aggregators, which map profiles of linear orders to a set of binary relations. This class of aggregators includes aggregators that yield a preference relation (social welfare functions) and those which yield a choice of an alternative (social choice functions). Equipped with this framework, I identify a property called Preference Reversal (PR) such that any Pareto efficient aggregator having this property must be dictatorial. This allows me to state a general impossibility theorem, which includes Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem as two special examples. Furthermore, I show that monotonicity and IIA are closely linked, by demonstrating that both are actually special cases of PR in specific environments. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:22:y:2004:i:2:p:317-330
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0291-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Muto, Nozomu & Sato, Shin, 2016. "Bounded response of aggregated preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 1-15.
    2. Merrill, Lauren Nicole, 2011. "Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 259-261, September.
    3. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2010. "Strategy-proofness and weighted voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 15-23, July.
    4. Lauren N. Merrill, 2007. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals," Working Papers 60, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    5. Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2015. "Impossibility theorems are modified and unified," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 849-866, December.
    6. Susumu Cato, 2010. "Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 267-284, July.
    7. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")," Public Economics 0510021, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Oct 2005.
    8. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2006. "Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 81-89, January.

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