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Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Changchen
  • Luo, Yunfeng
  • Zeng, Nvpo

Abstract

The paper combines the spirit of voluntary implementation and interactive implementation and finds out the full characterization of voluntary implementation when the planner is a player. Result covers the 2-person case, which is not considered in the paper of Baliga et al. (1997).

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Changchen & Luo, Yunfeng & Zeng, Nvpo, 2010. "Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 201-204, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:2:p:201-204
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
    2. Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November.
    3. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shuichi Tsugawa, 2021. "Two-agent interactive implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 251-266, December.

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