Selling two environmental services: In-kind payments for bird habitat and watershed protection in Los Negros, Bolivia
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Umbeck, John, 1977. "The California gold rush: A study of emerging property rights," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 197-226, July.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Rodriguez, Mauricio & Smulders, Sjak, 2022.
"Dynamic resource management under weak property rights: A tale of thieves and trespassers,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
- Mauricio Rodriguez & Sjak Smulders, 2016. "Dynamic Resource Management under Weak Property Rights: A Tale of Thieves and Trespassers," CESifo Working Paper Series 6019, CESifo.
- Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
- Clay, Karen & Wright, Gavin, 2005.
"Order without law? Property rights during the California gold rush,"
Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 155-183, April.
- Karen Clay & Gavin Wright, 2004. "Order Without Law? Property Rights During the California Gold Rush," Discussion Papers 03-033, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2010. ""Who's the thief?": Asymmetric Information and the Creation of Property Rights," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010 2010-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Gerald Friedman, "undated". "The Sanctity of Property Rights in American History," Working Papers wp14, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
- Stewart, James I., 2009. "Cooperation when N is large: Evidence from the mining camps of the American West," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 213-225, March.
- David Hugh-Jones & Carlo Perroni, 2015.
"Why are heterogeneous communities inefficient? Theory, history, and an experiment,"
Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)
15-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Hugh-Jones, David & Perroni, Carlo, 2015. "Why are heterogenous communities inefficient? Theory, history and an experiment," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 224, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- David Hugh-Jones & Carlo Perroni, 2015. "Why are heterogeneous communities inefficient? Theory, history and an experiment," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2015-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
- Vernon L. Smith, 2003.
"Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 465-508, June.
- Smith, Vernon L., 2002. "Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2002-7, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Adam Crepelle & Tate Fegley & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2024. "Military societies: self-governance and criminal justice in Indian country," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(3), pages 367-385, June.
- Ho, Hoang-Anh, 2023. "Land rights in historical Vietnam: Theory and evidence," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
- Bart J. Wilson & Taylor Jaworski & Karl E. Schurter & Andrew Smyth, 2012.
"The Ecological and Civil Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers' Rules of Capture,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 617-656, October.
- Bart J. Wilson & Taylor Jaworski & Karl Schurter & Andrew Smyth, 2010. "The Ecological and Civil Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers’ Rules of Capture," Working Papers 10-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade, Institutions, and Credit," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 495-521, October.
- Mike Brock, 2018. "Is the Monster Green-Eyed, or just Green? Assessing the Impact of Group Cohesion and Environmental Attitudes on Energy Conservation Habits," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2018-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Kimbrough, Erik O. & Smith, Vernon L. & Wilson, Bart J., 2010. "Exchange, theft, and the social formation of property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 206-229, June.
- Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 2001.
"Land institutions and land markets,"
Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 288-331,
Elsevier.
- Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1998. "Land institutions and land markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2014, The World Bank.
- Hugh-Jones, David & Perroni, Carlo, 2017.
"The logic of costly punishment reversed: Expropriation of free-riders and outsiders,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 112-130.
- Hugh-Jones, David & Perroni, Carlo, 2017. "The logic of costly punishment reversed: Expropriation of free-riders and outsiders," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 315, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- John Boyce & David Bruner, 2012. "Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 95-120, June.
- Edwards, Griffin & Robinson, Joshua J., 2019. "You gotta fight for your right? Publicly assigned but privately enforced property rights," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 31-39.
- Neudert, Regina & Rühs, Michael, 2013. "The Race for Leasing Rights: Pasture Access and Institutional Change During Post-socialist Reforms in Azerbaijan," Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources Discussion Papers 148489, Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:65:y:2008:i:4:p:675-684. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.