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Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes

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  • Chambers, Paul E.
  • Jensen, Richard
  • Whitehead, John C.

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  • Chambers, Paul E. & Jensen, Richard & Whitehead, John C., 1996. "Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 135-146, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:19:y:1996:i:2:p:135-146
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    5. Fisher, Anthony C. & Krutilla, John V., 1985. "Economics of nature preservation," Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, in: A. V. Kneese† & J. L. Sweeney (ed.), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 165-189, Elsevier.
    6. Todd Sandler, 1993. "Tropical Deforestation: Markets and Market Failures," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 69(3), pages 225-233.
    7. Simon, Julian L, 1990. "Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Country Debt: Comments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 199-200, Fall.
    8. Hansen, Stein, 1989. "Debt for nature swaps -- Overview and discussion of key issues," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 77-93, February.
    9. repec:cdl:ucsbec:9-94 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Richard J. Brazee & Douglas Southgate, 1992. "Development of Ethnobiologically Diverse Tropical Forests," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(4), pages 454-461.
    11. Kahn, James R. & McDonald, Judith A., 1995. "Third-world debt and tropical deforestation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 107-123, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stranlund, John K., 1999. "Bargaining to preserve a unique ecosystem: the role of anticipatory investments to establish stronger bargaining positions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 425-437, December.

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