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Lobbying in Antidumping

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  • Gasmi, Farid
  • Malin, Eric
  • Tandé, François

Abstract

We analyze the interaction between a domestic firm and an international trade agency in charge of administering an antidumping procedure by means of a model in which dumping is viewed as an "aggressive" behavior of foreign firms against domestic firms of a relatively low-efficiency type. An informed and benevolent agency grants protection exclusively to this type of domestic firms. We introduce asymmetric information about the domestic firm's efficiency and let the agency's decision be influenced by the firm's choices of output and lobbying contribution. We characterize (pure-strategy) equilibria the properties of which shed some light on the way politics and economics interplay in antidumping, and perform a comparative statics analysis that highlights some of the benefits of reforming antidumping laws.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gasmi, Farid & Malin, Eric & Tandé, François, 2004. "Lobbying in Antidumping," IDEI Working Papers 320, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:3403
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping law as a collusive device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(1), pages 95-122, February.
    2. Brainard, S. Lael & Martimort, David, 1997. "Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 33-65, February.
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    5. Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Dumping and double crossing: The (in)effectiveness of cost-based trade policy under incomplete information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 7, pages 129-152, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 2, pages 1-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    8. J.M. Finger & H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, 2002. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," Chapters, in: Institutions and Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 81-95, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    10. Rosendorff, B Peter, 1996. "Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 544-561, June.
    11. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. François Tandé, 2006. "Taxes antidumping et règle des faits disponibles," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 1053-1063.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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