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Targeting the poor using community information

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  • Rai, Ashok S.

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  • Rai, Ashok S., 2002. "Targeting the poor using community information," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 71-83, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:69:y:2002:i:1:p:71-83
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    1. Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2001. "Explaining Leakage of Public Funds," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-147, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-261, March.
    3. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    4. Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2000. "Distributional outcomes of a decentralized welfare program," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2316, The World Bank.
    5. Chambers, Robert, 1994. "Participatory rural appraisal (PRA): Challenges, potentials and paradigm," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(10), pages 1437-1454, October.
    6. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    7. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2001. "Community based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 23146, The World Bank.
    8. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September.
    9. Ching-To Ma, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(4), pages 555-572.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aubert, Cécile & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2009. "Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 153-162, September.
    2. Bond, Philip & Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Coordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate Pareto inferior equilibria?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 368-391, July.
    3. Bibi Sami, 2003. "On the Impact of Better Targeted Transfers on Poverty in Tunisia," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 17-35, January.
    4. González-Flores, Mario & Heracleous, Maria & Winters, Paul, 2012. "Leaving the Safety Net: An Analysis of Dropouts in an Urban Conditional Cash Transfer Program," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2505-2521.
    5. Bond, Philip & Pande, Rohini, 2005. "Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?," Center Discussion Papers 28436, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    6. Masahiro Shoji & Keitaro Aoyagi & Ryuji Kasahara & Yasuyuki Sawada, 2020. "Motives behind community participation: Evidence from natural and artefactual field experiments in Sri Lanka," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(5), pages 577-600, December.
    7. Emiliana Vegas & Ilana Umansky, 2005. "Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives : What Can We Learn from Education Reforms in Latin America?," World Bank Publications - Reports 8694, The World Bank Group.
    8. Henderson, Heath & Follett, Lendie, 2022. "Targeting social safety net programs on human capabilities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    9. Shoji, Masahiro & Aoyagi, Keitaro & Kasahara, Ryuji & Sawada, Yasuyuki, 2010. "Motives behind Community Participation," Working Papers 16, JICA Research Institute.
    10. Bardsley, Peter & Meager, Rachael, 2019. "Competing lending platforms, endogenous reputation, and fragility in microcredit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 107-126.
    11. Sawada, Yasuyuki & Ishii, Takaharu, 2012. "Do Community-Managed Schools Facilitate Social Capital Accumulation? Evidence from the COGES Project in Burkina Faso," Working Papers 42, JICA Research Institute.
    12. Sunny Li Sun & Junyon Im, 2015. "Cutting Microfinance Interest Rates: An Opportunity Co–Creation Perspective," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(1), pages 101-128, January.
    13. Matthew Olckers & Toby Walsh, 2022. "Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey," Papers 2210.01984, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.

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