The effect of traffic cameras on police effort: Evidence from India
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102953
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More about this item
Keywords
Police; Monitoring; Shirking; Public sector; Traffic violations; Corruption; India;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
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