Collective action in games as in life: Experimental evidence from canal cleaning in Haiti

This paper explores the impact of exposure to a collective action dilemma in a framed public goods game on farmers’ behavior in real-world scenarios characterized by similar strategic trade-offs. From a sample of 841 rice farmers in rural Haiti, I randomly selected 277 to participate in public goods games framed to mimic the real trade-off they face between private work and participation in the management of shared canals. Over the subsequent planting season, the local irrigation association organized voluntary canal-cleaning days to manage the shared canal systems that irrigate farmers’ fields. Treated farmers were 56% more likely than those in the control group to volunteer. The mechanisms through which the treatment seemed to operate was by increasing social connections between plot neighbors and shifting participants’ expectations of others’ contributions to the public good, suggesting that public goods games provide a setting in which to connect with and learn about one’s neighbors and to develop common norms of behavior.