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“Moving Umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China

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  • Shi, Xiangyu
  • Xi, Tianyang
  • Zhang, Xiaobo
  • Zhang, Yifan

Abstract

This paper studies the pattern of interregional investment after bureaucratic transfers across Chinese cities. Using the administrative records of business registration, we find that the transfer of a local leader between prefecture cities is associated with about 3% increase in interregional investment along the direction of transfer. The comoving firms purchase larger parcels of land and at lower prices. They also exhibit a higher likelihood of exiting when the patrons leave the office. Comoving interregional investment does not increase the probability of promotion for transferred leaders, and yet expose them to a higher risk of anticorruption prosecution. The findings highlight the importance of personal connection between firms and bureaucrats in shaping the pattern of interregional investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Shi, Xiangyu & Xi, Tianyang & Zhang, Xiaobo & Zhang, Yifan, 2021. "“Moving Umbrella”: Bureaucratic transfers and the comovement of interregional investments in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:153:y:2021:i:c:s0304387821000900
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102717
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bureaucratic transfer; Interregional investment; Comoving firms; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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