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The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Activity in China

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  • Giannetti, Mariassunta
  • Yu, Xiaoyun
  • Liao, Guanmin
  • You, Jiaxing

Abstract

We show that corruption affects negatively the performance of small entrepreneurial firms, which compete with corrupted industry peers. We exploit the Chinese anti-corruption campaign to establish causality and identify the channels through which corruption causes negative externalities. Small firms have lower sales growth in industries with high corruption, arguably because demand is diverted to the largest firms in their industries, which spend more in corrupting officials. Small firms also have higher financing costs in industries with high corruption and therefore invest less. Furthermore, corruption decreases the efficiency of labor and capital allocation and deters firm entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Giannetti, Mariassunta & Yu, Xiaoyun & Liao, Guanmin & You, Jiaxing, 2017. "The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Activity in China," CEPR Discussion Papers 12345, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12345
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    Cited by:

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    3. Colonnelli, Emanuele & Lagaras, Spyridon & Ponticelli, Jacopo & Prem, Mounu & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2022. "Revealing corruption: Firm and worker level evidence from Brazil," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1097-1119.
    4. Yanlei Zhang, 2021. "Greasing Dirty Machines: Evidence of Pollution-Driven Bribery in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 53-74, April.
    5. Francesco D'Acunto & Michael Weber & Jin Xie & Michael Weber, 2019. "Punish One, Teach A Hundred: The Sobering Effect of Punishment on the Unpunished," CESifo Working Paper Series 7512, CESifo.
    6. Hongfeng Peng & Xiao Zhang & Xiaoquan Zhu, 2017. "Political connections of the board of directors and credit financing: evidence from Chinese private enterprises," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 57(5), pages 1481-1516, December.
    7. Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A Kim, 2020. "Corporate Governance in China: A Survey [The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 733-772.
    8. Kong, Dongmin & Tao, Yunqing & Wang, Yanan, 2020. "China's anti-corruption campaign and firm productivity: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Guo, Jing & Wang, Yanan & Yang, Wei, 2021. "China's anti-corruption shock and resource reallocation in the energy industry," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    10. Zhang, Yifei, 2019. "Anti-Corruption Reforms and Microfinancing: Evidence from Households' Fintech Borrowing," MPRA Paper 97015, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Yaoqin Li & Xixiong Xu & Weiyu Gan, 2018. "Political extraction and corporate cash holdings in China," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 32(2), pages 76-94, November.
    12. Hao, Zhuoqun & Liu, Yu & Zhang, Jinfan & Zhao, Xiaoxue, 2020. "Political connection, corporate philanthropy and efficiency: Evidence from China’s anti-corruption campaign," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 688-708.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Corporate governance; Capital and labor allocation; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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