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Effects of limited interactions between individuals on cooperation in spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game

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  • Liu, Xu-Sheng
  • Guan, Jian-Yue
  • Wu, Zhi-Xi

Abstract

We study the spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with limited interactions by introducing two kinds of individuals, say type-A and type-B with a fraction of p and (1−p), respectively, distributed randomly on a square lattice. Each kind of individuals can adopt two pure strategies: either to cooperate or to defect. During the evolution, the individuals can only interact with others belonging to the same kind, but they can learn from either kinds of individuals in the nearest neighborhood. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the average frequency of cooperators ρC is calculated as a function of p in the equilibrium state. It is shown that, compared with the case of p=0 (only one kind of individuals existing in the system), cooperation can be evidently promoted. In particular, the cooperator density can reach a maximum level at some moderate values of p in a wide range of payoff parameters. The results imply that certain limited interactions between individuals plays an important and nontrivial role in the evolution of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Xu-Sheng & Guan, Jian-Yue & Wu, Zhi-Xi, 2013. "Effects of limited interactions between individuals on cooperation in spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 106-112.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:56:y:2013:i:c:p:106-112
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Xu-Wen & Wang, Zhen & Nie, Sen & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Wang, Bing-Hong, 2015. "Impact of keeping silence on spatial reciprocity in spatial games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 250(C), pages 848-853.
    2. Li, Ya & Lan, Xin & Deng, Xinyang & Sadiq, Rehan & Deng, Yong, 2014. "Comprehensive consideration of strategy updating promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 403(C), pages 284-292.
    3. Cai, Chao-Ran & Wu, Zhi-Xi & Guan, Jian-Yue, 2014. "Effect of vaccination strategies on the dynamic behavior of epidemic spreading and vaccine coverage," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 62, pages 36-43.

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