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The synergy of elimination and zero-determinant strategy on dynamic games

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  • Wang, Junfang
  • Shen, Aizhong

Abstract

Groups often fall into the trap of mutual betrayal because of the free-riding behavior of individuals. To promote cooperation level of the group, a dynamic game mechanism with elimination is proposed in this paper. Then, we study the individual and synergistic effects of the elimination mechanism and zero-determinant strategy on the game evolution. To reduce the number of eliminated players, we analyze the main influencing factors of node's survival rate. It is found that the dynamic game mechanism can change the dilemma of mutual betrayal, however many players will be eliminated. The synergy of zero-determinant strategy and elimination can not only keep a high cooperation level, but also enable more individuals to survive in the games. Moreover, the survival rate of a node is directly related to its degree and its initial strategy. And the results are robust to game model and rule of elimination. This provides a feasible game mechanism for improving the cooperation level of the group and provides the optimal strategy implementation scheme for the individuals to realize the maximization of benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Junfang & Shen, Aizhong, 2024. "The synergy of elimination and zero-determinant strategy on dynamic games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:182:y:2024:i:c:s0960077924002510
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114699
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    References listed on IDEAS

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