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The impact of intensive farming on land tenure: Evidence from Confucius' manors (1759–1901)

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  • Yang, He

Abstract

During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, fixed-rent tenancy gradually replaced sharecropping as the dominant form of land tenancy in China. This paper hypothesizes that the secular shift in land tenure was an adaptation to the change in land utilization system towards more intensive cropping. To test the hypothesis we exploit a dataset gathered from the rent collection archives of Confucius' Lineage in the Qing Dynasty. We estimate the effect of the adoption of wheat–soybean double cropping on the choice of tenancy contract, share contract versus fixed-rent contract. We find that double cropped plots were 23.7% more likely to be managed under fixed-rent contracts than annually cropped plots. Our findings are consistent with the implications of the factor endowment theory. The adoption of double cropping made farming more complex and placed greater demands on managerial inputs of tenants. In the absence of a factor market for managerial ability, optimal tenancy contract had adapted to provide tenants with a greater incentive to supply managerial inputs than had been the case in sharecropping arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, He, 2014. "The impact of intensive farming on land tenure: Evidence from Confucius' manors (1759–1901)," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 279-289.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:30:y:2014:i:c:p:279-289
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2014.07.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Double cropping; Sharecropping; Fixed-rent tenancy; Intensive farming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N55 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Asia including Middle East
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q16 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services

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