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The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols

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  • Wang, Yun

Abstract

Official reports and case studies reveal that China experienced different means of communication with the world powers since it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. In the first five years, China had public communication with both the United States and the European Union under the Transitional Review Mechanism. In 2006 a new means of communication, the China–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, started to take effect. Reports show that the new mechanism has advanced the China–US relationship positively and productively. The difference between the two means of communication stimulates our study. We adopt a game theory model to examine the impact of different communication protocols on China's incentives to reveal information. We analyze a cheap-talk game between an informed agent and two uninformed principals who coordinate actions under two communication protocols: public and private communication. First, all equilibria under both means of communication are characterized. Information precision of the agent's equilibrium messages decreases with the principals' preference biases. Second, under private communication the agent communicates more informatively with one principal if she in effect reveals little information to the other. Under private communication there exists an informative equilibrium with asymmetric levels of information precision even when all equilibria under public communication are uninformative.

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  • Wang, Yun, 2013. "The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 192-207.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:27:y:2013:i:c:p:192-207
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2013.04.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic information transmission; Tacit coordination; Public communication; Private communication; WTO;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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