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On the nature of guilt aversion: Insights from a new methodology in the dictator game

Author

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  • Balafoutas, Loukas
  • Sutter, Matthias

Abstract

The theory of guilt aversion has been shown to influence human behavior in many contexts. It suggests that an agent’s actions are influenced by his perception of other agents’ expectations, thus linking behavior to second order beliefs. We use a novel methodology to construct a proxy for second order beliefs through information revelation in an experimental dictator game, in which we inform dictators about the transfers received by each of their partners in the past. This methodology has certain advantages: in particular, it does not suffer from a false consensus effect and does not require withholding information from subjects. Our findings show that the effect of guilt aversion on giving depends on communication. In the baseline treatment, our proxy for beliefs cannot predict transfers. However, behavior is consistent with guilt aversion when communication between dictators and recipients takes place. Hence, our results highlight the sensitivity of guilt aversion to context.

Suggested Citation

  • Balafoutas, Loukas & Sutter, Matthias, 2017. "On the nature of guilt aversion: Insights from a new methodology in the dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 9-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:13:y:2017:i:c:p:9-15
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2016.12.001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Goff, Sandra H., 2021. "A test of willingness to pay as penance in the demand for ethical consumption," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    2. Claire Rimbaud & Alice Soldà, 2024. "Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(3), pages 491-547, July.
    3. Abraham, Diya & Greiner, Ben & Stephanides, Marianne, 2023. "On the Internet you can be anyone: An experiment on strategic avatar choice in online marketplaces," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 251-261.
    4. Gessner, Johannes & Habla, Wolfgang & Wagner, Ulrich J., 2023. "Can social comparisons and moral appeals increase public transport ridership and decrease car use?," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-003, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2022. "Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 833-882, September.
    6. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2023. "Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 690-717.
    7. Grodeck, Ben & Tausch, Franziska & Wang, Chengsi & Xiao, Erte, 2023. "To insure or not to insure? Promoting trust and cooperation with insurance advice in markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    8. Eli Spiegelman, 2021. "Embracing The Dark Side? Testing The Socialization Of A Maximizing Mindset," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(2), pages 740-761, April.
    9. Danilov, Anastasia & Khalmetski, Kiryl & Sliwka, Dirk, 2021. "Descriptive Norms and Guilt Aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 293-311.
    10. Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner, 2017. "The limits of guilt," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(2), pages 137-148, December.
    11. Doñate-Buendía, Anabel & García-Gallego, Aurora & Petrović, Marko, 2022. "Gender and other moderators of giving in the dictator game: A meta-analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 280-301.
    12. Claire Rimbaud & Alice Soldà, 2021. "Avoiding the Cost of your Conscience: Belief Dependent Preferences and Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2114, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    13. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-03620418 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Johannes Gessner & Wolfgang Habla & Ulrich J. Wagner, 2023. "Can Social Comparisons and Moral Appeals Induce a Modal Shift Towards Low-Emission Transport Modes?," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_451, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    15. Morell, Alexander, 2019. "The short arm of guilt – An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 332-345.
    16. Cartwright, Edward, 2019. "A survey of belief-based guilt aversion in trust and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 430-444.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Guilt aversion; Communication; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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