Exploring cyclic dominance in rock-paper-scissor strategies within the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma: A quantitative analysis with environmental feedback

This research investigation delves into the concept of cyclic dominance and its interplay with environmental feedback within the framework of the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (OPD) game. A quantitative model has been meticulously constructed to encompass both the OPD and Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games, wherein the outcomes are contingent upon environmental feedback. The intricate relationship between player populations and their surrounding environment is elucidated through the utilization of replicator dynamics. The empirical findings of this study shed light on the existence of distinct equilibria contingent upon the prevailing environmental circumstances. Under scenarios characterized by resource depletion, an equilibrium state emerges wherein only solitary individuals (referred to as "loners") persist. Conversely, under conditions of resource replenishment, an equilibrium is established where various strategic approaches coexist in equal proportions, akin to the dynamics of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Notably, cyclic dominance manifests itself during periods characterized by intermediate environmental conditions. Several pivotal factors have been identified as determinants of these dynamic phenomena, including the rate of environmental replenishment, the strength of the dilemma presented, the payoff for loners, and the reward for a draw. It has been empirically demonstrated that the presence of extreme values in the replenishment rate, irrespective of whether exceptionally high or exceptionally low, serves as an impediment to the emergence of cyclic dominance. This model underscores the substantial influence of environmental feedback on social dilemmas, particularly in the context of the OPD game, ultimately leading to the emergence of competitive cyclic dominance games reminiscent of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. In doing so, it elucidates the intricate interplay between evolutionary game incentives and the dynamics of the surrounding environment.