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A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory

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  • Grant, Simon
  • Kajii, Atsushi

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  • Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 1995. "A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1241-1249, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:5:p:1241-49
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Houba, Harold & Tieman, Alexander F. & Brinksma, Rene, 1998. "The Nash bargaining solution for decision weight utility functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 41-48, July.
    2. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel Lara, 2024. "Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 209-238, March.
    3. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Economic theory and game theory 014, Oscar Volij.
    4. Hanany, Eran & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 254-276, February.
    5. Grant, Simon & Kline, J. Jude & Quiggin, John, 2012. "Differential awareness, ambiguity, and incomplete contracts: A model of contractual disputes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 494-504.
    6. Hanany, Eran, 2007. "Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 72-84, April.
    7. Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Bargaining and Boldness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 28-51, January.
    8. Valenciano, Federico & Zarzuelo, Jose M., 1997. "On Nash's Hidden Assumption," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 266-281, October.
    9. Eran Hanany, 2001. "Ordinal Nash Social Welfare Function," Discussion Papers 1325, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games Econ. Behav. 38 (2002) 28-51]," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 165-168, October.
    11. Grant, Simon & Kline, Jeff & Quiggin, John, 2009. "A Matter of Interpretation: Bargaining over Ambiguous Contracts," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151190, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    12. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 17-24, September.
    13. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel de Lara, 2021. "Bargaining On Monotonic Economic Environments," Working Papers hal-03206724, HAL.
    14. Serrano, Roberto & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 1998. "Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 286-307, December.
    15. Hanany, Eran, 2008. "The ordinal Nash social welfare function," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(5-6), pages 405-422, April.
    16. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    17. Safra, Zvi & Segal, Uzi, 1998. "Constant Risk Aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 19-42, November.
    18. Alon, Shiri & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 60-71.
    19. Quiggin, John & Chambers, R.G.Robert G., 2004. "Invariant risk attitudes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 96-118, July.
    20. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2015. "On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 624-647.
    21. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 2012. "The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 23-42, January.

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