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Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets

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  • Hanany, Eran

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  • Hanany, Eran, 2007. "Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 72-84, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:72-84
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ok, Efe A. & Zhou, Lin, 2000. "The Choquet Bargaining Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 249-264, November.
    2. Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter, 1991. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1787-1801, November.
    3. Paolo Ghirardato & Massimo Marinacci, 2001. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(4), pages 864-890, November.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Weymark, John A., 1981. "Generalized gini inequality indices," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 409-430, August.
    6. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
    7. Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 1995. "A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1241-1249, September.
    8. Gul, Faruk, 1991. "A Theory of Disappointment Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 667-686, May.
    9. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-1186, September.
    10. Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games Econ. Behav. 38 (2002) 28-51]," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 165-168, October.
    11. Hanany, Eran & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 254-276, February.
    12. Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Bargaining and Boldness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 28-51, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel Lara, 2024. "Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 209-238, March.
    2. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel de Lara, 2021. "Bargaining On Monotonic Economic Environments," Working Papers hal-03206724, HAL.
    3. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2015. "On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 624-647.

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