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OPEC and the U.S. Oil Import Tariff

Author

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  • Karp, Larry
  • Newbery, David M

Abstract

Open-loop Nash extraction plans of exhaustible resource producers (in which producers take the plans of others as given) are time consistent, but proposed open-loop oil import tariffs are almost always time inconsistent. The paper derives a time consistent open-loop Nash tariff that can be readily computed for both competitive and a Nash-Cournot specification of the oil market. The authors illustrate the time sequence of the optimal import tariff for a simple model of the United States facing a duopolistic version of OPEC and a comparative fringe of oil producers, and compare the outcome with the competitive equilibrium. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Karp, Larry & Newbery, David M, 1991. "OPEC and the U.S. Oil Import Tariff," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(405), pages 303-313, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:101:y:1991:i:405:p:303-13
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Zili, 2008. "How Does ANWR Exploration Affect OPEC Behavior --A Simulation Study of an Open-loop Cournot-Nash Game," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 321-332, March.
    2. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 479-497, December.
    3. Benchekroun, Hassan & Breton, Michèle & Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray, 2019. "Mergers in nonrenewable resource oligopolies and environmental policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 35-52.
    4. Mr. Jon Strand, 2008. "Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation: A Geo-Political Model," IMF Working Papers 2008/035, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Schob, Ronnie, 1999. "Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 311-329, June.
    6. Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder & Bergman, Lars, 2005. "International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process," Working Papers in Economics 08/05, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    7. Kisswani, Khalid/ M., 2011. "The effects of the U.S. price control policies on OPEC: lessons from the past," MPRA Paper 34624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Stephen P. A. Brown & Hillard G. Huntington, 2003. "Terms of trade and OECD policies to mitigate global climate change," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    9. Christian Beermann, 2015. "Climate Policy and the Intertemporal Supply of Fossil Resources," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 62.
    10. Melanie Parravano & Luis Enrique Pedauga, 2008. "Oil market dynamics: A Markow chain analysis," Economía, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (IIES). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales. Universidad de Los Andes. Mérida, Venezuela, vol. 33(25), pages 87-115, january-j.
    11. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Bergman, Lars, 2005. "International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process," MPRA Paper 10624, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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