Our product is unique: A note on a delegation game with differentiated products
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More about this item
Keywords
Strategic Delegation; Managerial Incentives; Oligopoly;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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