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The direct and indirect effects of audits on the tax revenue in Greece

Author

Listed:
  • Athanasios O. Tagkalakis

    (Bank of Greece)

Abstract

This paper uses recently unveiled monthly information from the Hellenic Ministry of Finance on tax audits targeted to large enterprises, high wealth individuals and VAT non-filers and finds evidence that an increase in the number of audits can boost revenue performance. A 1 percent increase in the number of tax audits increases the direct revenue yield of audits by about 0.4 percent. The indirect tax revenue effect of an intensification of tax audits is estimated to be 0.1 percent. The intensification of targeted audits, as well as improvements in the collection of taxes and fines can tackle tax evasion and boost revenue performance, contributing, thus, to the fiscal consolidation effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Athanasios O. Tagkalakis, 2014. "The direct and indirect effects of audits on the tax revenue in Greece," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 984-1001.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-00166
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    audits; tax administration; reform; taxes; fines;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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