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An experimental study of e-mail games with strategic information transmission and communication cost

Author

Listed:
  • Toshiji Kawagoe

    (Future University Hakodate)

  • Hirokazu Takizawa

    (Chuo University)

Abstract

We experimentally examined several versions of Rubinstein (1989)'s e-mail game in the laboratory. He shows that, in the unique equilibrium of this game, players behave as if no information is exchanged, no matter how many messages are successfully sent. This has been regarded as a "paradox of almost common knowledge." Binmore and Samuelson (2001) later extended Rubinstein's model by replacing automatic information transmission with the strategic one, or by introducing communication costs. We test these theories in the laboratory experiment. In general, our experimental results fail to provide support for Binmore and Samuelson's prediction. While they predict that those changes will induce players to take heed of the exchanged messages, our experimental results show little evidences to support their predictions and contradictory results in some cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2012. "An experimental study of e-mail games with strategic information transmission and communication cost," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 2921-2929.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00490
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    3. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 6-30, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    E-mail game; almost common knowledge; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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