IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-08f10023.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic Trade Policy in Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Leonard F. S. Wang

    (Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung)

  • Wei Zhao

    (Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi¡¦an Jiaotong University)

  • Ya -Chin Wang

    (Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University)

Abstract

In this paper, we assess the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on strategic trade policies. In particular, how the trade policy and the bargaining process over managerial contract are strategically connected within the context of bargaining over the sales delegation model is analyzed. We explore the policy impacts in two different models: the export rivalry model and the import-competing model, and show that the introduction of managers' bargaining process leads to a decrease in the export subsidy and optimal tariff in different models.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard F. S. Wang & Wei Zhao & Ya -Chin Wang, 2008. "Strategic Trade Policy in Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(38), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08f10023
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume6/EB-08F10023A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    2. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2008. "Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Differentiated Goods Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(6), pages 1-8.
    3. Roger Clarke & David R. Collie, 2006. "Optimum‐Welfare And Maximum‐Revenue Tariffs Under Bertrand Duopoly," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(3), pages 398-408, July.
    4. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
    5. Ritz, Robert A., 2008. "Strategic incentives for market share," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 586-597, March.
    6. Mai, Chao-cheng & Hwang, Hong, 1988. "Optimal export subsidies and marginal cost differentials," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 279-282.
    7. Das, Satya P., 1997. "Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 173-188, August.
    8. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    9. Arjen van Witteloostuijn & Thijs Jansen & Arie van Lier, 2007. "Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 897-904.
    10. David de Meza, 1986. "Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 347-350, May.
    11. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:6:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Jansen, Thijs & van Lier, Arie & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen, 2007. "A note on strategic delegation: The market share case," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 531-539, June.
    13. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2008. "Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Quadratic Cost Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(16), pages 1-7.
    14. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    15. Collie, David, 1991. "Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs under Oligopoly," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 38(4), pages 398-401, November.
    16. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sudeshna Bandyopadhyay, 2001. "Efficient bargaining, welfare and strategic export policy," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 133-149.
    17. Yasuhiko Nakamura & Kohei Kamaga, 2008. "Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Sequential Move Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(7), pages 1-8.
    18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:7:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2016. "Passive unilateral cross-ownership and strategic trade policy," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 10, pages 1-22.
    2. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2018. "Firms Controlled by Owners and Managerial Firms: The 'Strategic' Trade Policy Game Revisited," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 71(1), pages 51-72.
    3. Buccella Domenico & Meccheri Nicola, 2024. "Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 24(1), pages 159-193, January.
    4. Kangsik Choi, 2022. "Organizational form and multiple exportable goods in export rivalry trade," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(5), pages 565-586, September.
    5. Kangsik Choi & Ki‐Dong Lee, 2022. "Strategic delegation and network externalities under export rivalry market," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(1), pages 1-19, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2008:i:38:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2018. "Firms Controlled by Owners and Managerial Firms: The 'Strategic' Trade Policy Game Revisited," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 71(1), pages 51-72.
    3. Leonard Wang & Ya-Chin Wang & Lihong Zhao, 2009. "Market Share Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 49-56, March.
    4. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2011. "Bargaining over managerial delegation contracts and merger incentives in an international oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 47-61, March.
    5. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2018. "Bargaining over managerial contracts: a note," MPRA Paper 86143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ya‐chin Wang & Leonard F.s. Wang, 2009. "Equivalence Of Competition Mode In A Vertically Differentiated Duopoly With Delegation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(4), pages 577-590, December.
    7. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2017. "Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 83-119, March.
    8. Ya-Chin Wang, 2013. "Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 81(4), pages 605-624, December.
    9. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2008. "Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Quadratic Cost Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(16), pages 1-7.
    10. Buccella Domenico & Meccheri Nicola, 2024. "Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 24(1), pages 159-193, January.
    11. Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Manasakis, Constantine & Mitrokostas, Evangelos & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 205-217.
    12. Stefano Colombo, 2022. "Prisoner dilemma in a vertical duopoly with managerial delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(5), pages 1476-1481, July.
    13. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:16:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Liang, Wen-Jung & Tseng, Ching-Chih & Wang, Kuang-Cheng Andy, 2011. "Location choice with delegation: Bertrand vs. Cournot competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1774-1781, July.
    15. Luciano Fanti, 2017. "An Observable Delay Game with Unionised Managerial Firms," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(1), pages 50-69, February.
    16. Rupayan Pal, 2012. "Delegation And Emission Tax In A Differentiated Oligopoly," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 80(6), pages 650-670, December.
    17. Werner Neus & Manfred Stadler, 2018. "Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(7), pages 814-820, October.
    18. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca & Sodini, Mauro, 2012. "Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 45(12), pages 1469-1478.
    19. Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Managerial compensation contracts in quantity-setting duopoly," Working Papers 2012/17, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    20. repec:hok:dpaper:307 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. John S. Heywood & Zheng Wang, 2016. "Strategic delegation under spatial price discrimination," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95, pages 193-213, March.
    22. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2011. "Stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with managerial sales delegation and bounded rationality," MPRA Paper 33828, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2014. "Organizational structure, strategic delegation and innovation in oligopolistic industries," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining Delegation;

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08f10023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.