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Mediator learning and dowry determination in an arranged marriage setting

Author

Listed:
  • Jeremy Bertomeu

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Hamid Beladi

    (Department of Economics, University of Texas at San Antonio)

Abstract

Recently, Batabyal (2005) has analyzed a game model of dowry determination in which a mediator plays a key role. Batabyal's analysis shows that the equilibrium dowry offers from the bride and the groom optimally trade off the desire to make an assertive offer with the likelihood that this offer will be selected by the mediator. We extend the Batabyal (2005) analysis by studying the impact that learning—about the circumstances of a prospective marriage—by the mediator has on the tripartite interaction between the bride, the groom, and the mediator. Specifically, we first determine the optimal dowry offers from the bride and the groom in a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Next, we show that the mediator perfectly infers the private information of the two parties from their dowry offers and that he then uses this information in part to select his preferred dowry offer.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Bertomeu & Hamid Beladi, 2007. "Mediator learning and dowry determination in an arranged marriage setting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(12), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07o10013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rao, Vijayendra, 1993. "The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 666-677, August.
    2. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 2001. "On the likelihood of finding the right partner in an arranged marriage," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-280, May.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    4. Francis Bloch & Vijayendra Rao, 2002. "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1029-1043, September.
    5. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
    6. Gibbons, Robert, 1988. "Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 896-912, December.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2005:i:3:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, April.
    9. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2004. "Meetings and exposure before an arranged marriage: a probabilistic analysis," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(8), pages 473-476.
    10. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "A game model of dowry determination in an arranged marriage context," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(3), pages 1-8.
    11. Dalmia, Sonia, 2004. "A hedonic analysis of marriage transactions in India: estimating determinants of dowries and demand for groom characteristics in marriage," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 235-255, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet A Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2013. "Setting the dowry optimally to extract the full surplus: a contract theory perspective," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2034-2041.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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