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Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?

Author

Listed:
  • David Levine

    (UCLA)

  • Balázs Szentes

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

We show that the problem of whether two Turing Machines are functionally equivalent is undecidable and explain why this is significant for the theory of repeated play and evolution.

Suggested Citation

  • David Levine & Balázs Szentes, 2006. "Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 1(1), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06a00001
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2007. "The evolution of cooperation through imitation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 293-315, February.
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    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic Theory;

    JEL classification:

    • A0 - General Economics and Teaching - - General
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics

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