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Research Joint Ventures Cartelization with Asymmetric R&D Spillovers

Author

Listed:
  • Gamal Atallah

    (University of Ottawa and CIRANO)

Abstract

The paper analyzes the profitability of R&D cooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that a firm prefers R&D competition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization when the spillover rate of its competitor is sufficiently high. The equilibrium configuration is RJV cartelization for low spillover asymmetries, R&D competition for intermediate asymmetries, and R&D cartelization for high asymmetries.

Suggested Citation

  • Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Research Joint Ventures Cartelization with Asymmetric R&D Spillovers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(18), pages 1-11.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05l10022
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 919-936, August.
    2. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-24, CIRANO.
    3. Petit, Maria Luisa & Tolwinski, Boleslaw, 1999. "R&D cooperation or competition?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 185-208, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Duarte Leite & Pedro Campos & Isabel Mota, 2011. "Computational Results on Membership in R&D Cooperation Networks: To Be or Not To Be in a Research Joint Venture," FEP Working Papers 420, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    2. Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2016. "Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 179-188.
    3. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2012. "What is the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D?," IDEC DP2 Series 2-6, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
    4. Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2014. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 166524, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric Spillovers;

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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