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Why Resisting Globalization Can Be Reasonable

Author

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  • Kenji Fujiwara

    (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University)

Abstract

A two-agent model of international trade with oligopoly and increasing returns is proposed to address why there have been persistent anti-trade-liberalization movements. It is shown that all of a country's residents lose from trade under certain conditions on the cross-country cost structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenji Fujiwara, 2006. "Why Resisting Globalization Can Be Reasonable," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(5), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05f10086
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2006/Volume6/EB-05F10086A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Murray C. Kemp & Koji Shimomura, 2001. "Gains From Trade in a Cournot–Nash General Equilibrium," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 52(3), pages 284-302, September.
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    5. Kenji Fujiwara, 2005. "Unilateral and Multilateral Gains from Trade in International Oligopoly," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 81(255), pages 404-413, December.
    6. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 2004. "In Defense of Globalization: It Has a Human Face," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(6), pages 9-20, November-.
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    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade

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