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Economic solubility of the agency problem

Author

Listed:
  • John Quiggin

    (Australian Research Council Senior Fellow, Australian National University)

Abstract

Conditions are derived under which the solution to the Grossman-Hart formulation of the agency problem involves zero or non-zero effort

Suggested Citation

  • John Quiggin, 2001. "Economic solubility of the agency problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(4), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70001
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-276, April.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    4. Quiggin, John & Chambers, Robert G., 1998. "A state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems with an application to point-source pollution control," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 441-472, December.
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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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