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Sicherheit, Strafe und positive Alternativen

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Susanne Neckermann

Abstract

The economics of crime concentrates on policies in the form of punishments. To adopt such a policy is unwise for several reasons. On the one hand, there are important instances in which punishment is unable to reduce crime or may even increase it. On the other hand, there are feasible alternatives such as positive incentives for law-abiding behavior. These alternative approaches tend to create a positive-sum environment by encouraging intrinsically motivated, proper conduct. The possibilities and limits of the proposed positive approaches are discussed using terrorism as an example. Die Ökonomik der Kriminalität und die darauf aufbauende Ökonomik der Sicherheit konzentrieren sich vorwiegend auf Strafen als Mittel der Politik. Dies ist aus verschiedenen Gründen unklug. Zum einen gibt es eine Reihe von Bedingungen, unter denen Bestrafung nicht wirkt oder die Zahl der Straftaten sogar erhöht. Zum anderen existieren effektive Alternativen zur Bestrafung. Insbesondere sind dies positive Anreize, wie Belohnungen für gesetzestreues Verhalten. Eine auf Belohnungen aufbauende Politik schafft eine positive Atmosphäre, die intrinsisch motiviertes, gesetzestreues Verhalten fördert und damit für alle Seiten vorteilhaft ist. Die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen positiver Ansätze zur Sicherheitserhöhung werden am Beispiel Terrorismus diskutiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2009. "Sicherheit, Strafe und positive Alternativen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 78(4), pages 61-72.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:78-4-6
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.78.4.61
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; punishment; incentives; motivation; terrorism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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