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Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard

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  • Anja Olbrich

Abstract

Optimally designed reimbursement and liability rules lead physicians to practice efficiently and carefully. The introduction of supply-side cost sharing in Germany and elsewhere should therefore be complemented by an appropriate liability incentive. Otherwise, resources are used efficiently but the level of care is too low. Under the assumptions of liability uncertainty and heterogeneous physicians I derive an optimal standard of due care. In deciding whether a physician acted negligently or not, the standard defines the liability threat of the negligence rule. Dependent on the distribution of physicians' types, probabilities of type one and type two errors in courts' judgments, and society's costs of negligence and defensive medicine, this second-best standard may well be above the first-best level of care. In contrast, medico-legal experts currently plead for a decrease of the standard of due care to cope with an increase of liability threat. Optimal abgestimmte Vergütungs- und Haftungsregeln regen den Arzt zu einer effizienten Ressourcenverwendung und einem angemessenen Sorgfaltsniveau an. Die nicht nur in Deutschland zu beobachtende Abkehr von der Kostenerstattung hin zu Vergütungsformen mit mehr Kostenverantwortung für den Arzt zielt vornehmlich auf eine Ressourceneinsparung. Da sie zugleich aber das Sorgfaltsniveau bedroht, sollte ein geeigneter Haftungsanreiz bestehen. Im vorliegenden Papier beschreibe ich unter prospektiver Vergütung sowie den realistischen Annahmen von Haftungsunsicherheit und Unterschieden zwischen den Ärzten in der Sorgfaltswaltung einen wohlfahrtsoptimalen Sorgfaltsstandard. Dieser entscheidet unter dem herrschenden Verschuldensprinzip über die Verurteilung eines Arztes zu Schadensersatz und definiert damit den Haftungsanreiz. Es erweist sich, dass der Standard in Abhängigkeit von den Eigenschaften der Ärzte, der Wahrscheinlichkeit gerichtlicher Fehlentscheidungen und der relativen gesellschaftlichen Belastung durch Fahrlässigkeit und Defensivmedizin größer oder kleiner als das Wohlfahrtsoptimum unter Sicherheit ist. Dieses Ergebnis steht im Kontrast zu Empfehlungen von Experten, die in Anbetracht eines steigenden Haftungsdrucks eine Absenkung der Sorgfaltsanforderungen befürworten.

Suggested Citation

  • Anja Olbrich, 2004. "Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(4), pages 567-574.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-40-8
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.73.4.567
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