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DÉBAT-Autorité de gestion et avaries communes:une note de lecture

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Albouy

    (Université Pierre Mendès France Grenoble)

Abstract

(VF) Comment expliquer que la gouvernance reste dominée davantage par une approche actionnariale que partenariale ? Cette note propose une lecture critique de l’article de Segrestin et Hatchuel publié dans Finance- Contrôle-Stratégie (vol. 14, n° 2, juin 2011) sur l’autorité de gestion et les avaries communes. Il s’agit d’une part d’essayer de répondre à la question que se posent les auteurs et, d’autre part, de questionner leurs propositions, qui remettent forte- ment en question le pouvoir des actionnaires dans l’entreprise. (VA)How to explain the prevalence of shareholder-centered approaches to corporate governance despite their critics? This note proposes a critical reading of the article published by Segrestin and Hatchuel in Finance-Contrôle- Stratégie (vol. 14, n° 2, June 2011) on managerial authority and general averages. We try to answer the question addressed by the authors and to question their propositions, which tend to reduce the power of stockholders in corporations.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Albouy, 2011. "DÉBAT-Autorité de gestion et avaries communes:une note de lecture," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(4), pages 7-19, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q4:p:7-19.
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel Aglietta & Antoine Rebérioux, 2005. "Corporate Governance Adrift," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3675.
    2. Peter Wirtz, 2005. "« Meilleures pratiques » de gouvernance et création de valeur : une appréciation critique des codes de bonne conduite," ACCRA, Association francophone de comptabilité, vol. 11(1), pages 141-159.
    3. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(2), pages 110-110.
    4. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 351-351.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1998. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 1(2), pages 57-88, June.
    7. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
    8. M. Albouy, 2010. "Crise financière et gouvernance des organisations," Post-Print halshs-00544195, HAL.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Comment concilier finance et management ?
      by Michel Albouy in Contrepoints on 2017-11-18 09:40:47

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    actionnaires; management; gouvernance; entreprise; shareholders; management; governance; firms.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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