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Pay at the Top: A Study of the Sensitivity of Top Director Remuneration to Company Specific Shocks

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  • Conyon, Martin J
  • Gregg, Paul

Abstract

This article considers the empirical determination of top directors' pay during the 1980s. In a sample of approximately 170 companies between 1985 and 1990 we find that director pay is significantly related to shareholder returns, but the estimated elasticity is small. In line with other research, sales growth is an inaportant predictor o f top pay. The current article is novel in that we study whether limits to managerial discretion and organisational restructuring are important in influencing top pay. Importantly, we find that company sales growth through acquiring other firms and increasing indebtedness significantly raise top directors' remuneration above that which can be achieved by internal or organic growth, Also relative performance evaluation in terms of sales growth, reducing union presence and whether or not the company is a subsidiary are all important influences on top pay. However, yardstick conzparisons appear not to apply to shareholder returns, yet under-performance post-acquisition is not punished in line with under-performance for other reasons. Overall though the after allowing for performance and such changes to the firms' operating environment top directors' remuneration the going rate still rose at a rate of 12 to 16 per cent per year between 1985 and 1990, In real terms this was approximately four times that of the average worker in the same sample of firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Conyon, Martin J & Gregg, Paul, 1994. "Pay at the Top: A Study of the Sensitivity of Top Director Remuneration to Company Specific Shocks," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 149, pages 83-92, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:nierev:v:149:y:1994:i::p:83-92_7
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    Cited by:

    1. Bianconi, Marcelo & Tan, Chih Ming, 2019. "Evaluating the instantaneous and medium-run impact of mergers and acquisitions on firm values," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-87.
    2. Michelle Haynes & Steve Thompson & Mike Wright, 2007. "Executive Remuneration and Corporate Divestment: Motivating Managers to Make Unpalatable Decisions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5‐6), pages 792-818, June.
    3. Firth, M. & Tam, M. & Tang, M., 1999. "The determinants of top management pay," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 617-635, December.
    4. Hristos Doucouliagos & Janto Haman & T.D. Stanley, 2012. "Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 670-703, July.
    5. Andrew Benito & Martin Conyon, 1999. "The Governance of Directors' Pay: Evidence from UK Companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 3(2), pages 117-136, June.
    6. Martin J. Conyon, 1995. "Directors' Pay in the Privatized Utilities," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 159-171, June.
    7. Wright, Peter & Thompson, Steve & Girma, Sourafel, 2002. "Merger Activity and Executive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 3255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Phillip McKnight & Cyril Tomkins, 1999. "Top Executive Pay in the United Kingdom: A Corporate Governance Dilemma," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 223-243.
    9. Yaron Amzaleg & Abraham Mehrez, 2004. "The ‘One Million Club:’ Executive Compensation And Firm Performance," Israel Economic Review, Bank of Israel, vol. 2(1), pages 107-147.
    10. Liu, Lisa Shifei & Stark, Andrew W., 2009. "Relative performance evaluation in board cash compensation: UK empirical evidence," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 21-30.
    11. Dong, Min & Ozkan, Aydin, 2008. "Institutional investors and director pay: An empirical study of UK companies," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 16-29, February.
    12. Intan Oviantari Author_Email: ioviantari@yahoo.com, 2011. "Directors And Commissioners Remuneration And Firm Performance: Indonesian Evidence," 2nd International Conference on Business and Economic Research (2nd ICBER 2011) Proceeding 2011-287, Conference Master Resources.
    13. Phillip J. McKnight, 1996. "An Explanation of Top Executive Pay: A UK Study," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 34(4), pages 557-566, December.
    14. Xuan Yang & Qiusheng Zhang & Xiaotian Shen & Jie Qin & Qian Sun & Yuanze Xu, 2022. "Could the Opening of HSR Reduce the M&A Premium?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-28, May.
    15. Agyei-Boapeah, Henry & Ntim, Collins G. & Fosu, Samuel, 2019. "Governance structures and the compensation of powerful corporate leaders in financial firms during M&As," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).
    16. Conyon, Martin J., 1997. "Corporate governance and executive compensation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 493-509, July.

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