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The Stabilizing Effects of Publishing Strategic Central Bank Projections

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  • Ahrens, Steffen
  • Lustenhouwer, Joep
  • Tettamanzi, Michele

Abstract

Expectations are among the main driving forces for economic dynamics. Therefore, managing expectations has become a primary objective for monetary policy seeking to stabilize the business cycle. In this paper, we study whether central banks can manage private-sector expectations by means of publishing one-period ahead inflation projections in a New Keynesian learning-to-forecast experiment. Subjects in the experiment observe these projections along with the historic development of the economy and subsequently submit their own one-period ahead inflation forecasts. In this context, we find that the central bank can significantly manage private-sector expectations and that this management strongly supports monetary policy in stabilizing the economy. Moreover, published central bank inflation projections drastically reduce the probability of a deflationary spiral after strong negative shocks to the economy.

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  • Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2023. "The Stabilizing Effects of Publishing Strategic Central Bank Projections," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 826-868, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:27:y:2023:i:3:p:826-868_10
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