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Agent and stewardship behavior: How do they differ?

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  • Martin, John A.
  • Butler, Frank C.

Abstract

The purpose of this study is examine how agency theory and stewardship theory lead to different firm-level outcomes on an array of different outcomes. Based on these differences, we argue for the development of an agent–steward measurement scale, which will help researchers classify chief executive officers (CEOs) along an agent–steward continuum. This, in turn, will spur research to predict and test CEO behaviors and firm-level outcomes. Agency theory suggests CEOs take advantage of their powerful positions to maximize their personal economic utility, whereas stewardship theory suggests CEOs are motivated through intrinsic awards and will balance their interests with those of other stakeholders. We use these theories to examine possible differences in CEO behaviors. This is important because different CEO behaviors might lead to differing impacts on important firm-level outcomes. This paper reviews the relevant agency and stewardship literatures, then offers propositions regarding CEO behaviors from agent and steward perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin, John A. & Butler, Frank C., 2017. "Agent and stewardship behavior: How do they differ?," Journal of Management & Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(5), pages 633-646, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jomorg:v:23:y:2017:i:05:p:633-646_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Alam, Ahmed W. & Farjana, Ashupta & Houston, Reza, 2024. "Geopolitical risk, CEO power, and corporate lobbying: Do powerful CEOs lobby more?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PA).
    2. Greiner, Michael & Kim, Jaemin & Cordon Thor, Jennifer, 2023. "Narcissistic CEOs and their corporate political activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    3. Peng Xu & Guiyu Bai, 2019. "Board Governance, Sustainable Innovation Capability and Corporate Expansion: Empirical Data from Private Listed Companies in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(13), pages 1-17, June.
    4. Tianyu Ma & Jiyong Ding & Zhuofu Wang & Miroslaw J. Skibniewski, 2020. "Governing Government-Project Owner Relationships in Water Megaprojects: a Concession Game Analysis on Allocation of Control Rights," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 34(13), pages 4003-4018, October.
    5. Camisón-Haba, Sergio & González-Cruz, Tomás, 2020. "Information assets: A typology of disclosed and non-disclosed information," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    6. Greiner, Michael & Lee, Jaegul, 2020. "A supply-side approach to corporate political activity: Performance consequences of ideologically driven CPA," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 25-37.
    7. Blessing Dirani, 2023. "In Stakeholder Capitalism, have all Actors Found Each Other or is it a Marriage of Convenience?," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 7(12), pages 1826-1838, December.

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