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The economic theory of rights

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  • HOLCOMBE, RANDALL G.

Abstract

People have rights to the degree that they are willing to claim them and are able to enforce them, either themselves or through a third-party enforcer. This economic theory of rights is based on the rights people actually do have and are able to exercise, not the rights they should have based on some normative criteria. Natural rights theories and contractual rights theories are examined and found to be ambiguous as to the actual rights they imply. Furthermore, there is no assurance that people will actually be able to exercise any natural rights or agreed-upon rights. People's actual ability to claim and enforce rights is based on the economic and political power they have, which in turn is based on their ability to provide benefits to others in exchange for others respecting the claimed rights, and in some cases being willing to use force to make others respect them.

Suggested Citation

  • Holcombe, Randall G., 2014. "The economic theory of rights," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 471-491, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:10:y:2014:i:03:p:471-491_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Randall Holcombe, 2008. "Why does government produce national defense?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 11-19, October.
    2. Leland B. Yeager, 1985. "Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 259-294, Spring/Su.
    3. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    4. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
    5. Randall G. Holcombe, 1994. "The Economic Foundations of Government," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-13230-0, October.
    6. repec:wvu:wpaper:09-09 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Plinio Limata, 2020. "Blockchain and Institutions (II): The Realm of Law," CERBE Working Papers wpC36, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.
    3. repec:wvu:wpaper:09-09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Turan Yay & Gülsün G. Yay & Tolga Aksoy, 2018. "Impact of institutions on entrepreneurship: a panel data analysis," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 8(1), pages 131-160, April.
    5. Cai, Meina & Murtazashvili, Ilia & Murtazashvili, Jennifer, 2020. "The politics of land property rights," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 151-167, April.
    6. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2019. "The political economy of legal titling," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 251-268, September.

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