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Corruption, Quasi-Rents, and the Regulation of Electric Utilities

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  • NEUFELD, JOHN L.

Abstract

Was the adoption of state utility regulation the result of a negative-sum competition among special interest groups vying for the monopoly rents created by regulation or a positive-sum elimination of corruption arising from appropriable quasi-rents? Previous empirical studies of the adoption of regulation have assumed the former. Using discrete hazard analysis, this study considers the latter and finds the data more consistent with the positive-sum protection of quasi-rents than the negative-sum creation and appropriation of monopoly rents.

Suggested Citation

  • Neufeld, John L., 2008. "Corruption, Quasi-Rents, and the Regulation of Electric Utilities," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 1059-1097, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:68:y:2008:i:04:p:1059-1097_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Montolio, Daniel & Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 18-31.
    2. Trillas, Francesc, 2010. "Network industries and regulatory jurisdiction," IESE Research Papers D/859, IESE Business School.
    3. Trillas, Francesc, 2010. "Electricity and telecoms reforms in the EU: Insights from the economics of federalism," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 66-76, June.
    4. Thomas Lyon & Nathan Wilson, 2012. "Capture or contract? The early years of electric utility regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 225-241, December.
    5. Paul G. Mahoney, 2012. "The Public Utility Pyramids," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-66.
    6. Montolio, Daniel & Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 18-31.

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