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Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange

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  • Mitchell, Ronald B.
  • Keilbach, Patricia M.

Abstract

States experiencing negative externalities caused by other states' behaviors have incentives to devise international institutions to change those behaviors. The institutions states create to counter incentives to defect vary in whether and how they expand institutional scope to accomplish that goal. When facing symmetric externalities, states tend to devise narrow institutions based on issue-specific reciprocity. When facing asymmetric externalities, or upstream/downstream problems, states tend to broaden institutional scope using linkage strategies. When victims of an externality are stronger than its perpetrators, the resulting institutions, if any are devised, are likely to incorporate the negative linkage of sanctions or coercion. When victims are weaker, exchange institutions relying on the positive linkage of rewards are more likely. We illustrate the influence of situation structure on institutional design with three cases: international whaling, ozone-layer depletion, and Rhine River pollution.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitchell, Ronald B. & Keilbach, Patricia M., 2001. "Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 891-917, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:55:y:2001:i:04:p:891-917_44
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    1. K Kogan & U Spiegel, 2006. "Dynamic zigzag pricing of resalable goods with no depreciation and intergroup externalities," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 57(11), pages 1353-1365, November.
    2. P. B. Anand, 2004. "Financing the Provision of Global Public Goods," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 215-237, February.
    3. Andrea Gerlak & Jonathan Lautze & Mark Giordano, 2011. "Water resources data and information exchange in transboundary water treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 179-199, May.
    4. Christopher Marcoux & Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "Capacity, not constraints: A theory of North-South regulatory cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 399-424, December.
    5. Alexander Ovodenko, 2016. "Regional Water Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(6), pages 1071-1098, September.
    6. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "A California Effect for International Environmental Externalities?," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 170-189, April.
    7. Sarker, Pradip Kumar & Rahman, Md Saifur & Giessen, Lukas, 2018. "Regional governance by the South Asia Cooperative Environment Program (SACEP)? Institutional design and customizable regime policy offering flexible political options," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 454-470.
    8. Diana Panke, 2020. "Regional cooperation through the lenses of states: Why do states nurture regional integration?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 475-504, April.
    9. Steffen Mohrenberg & Vally Koubi & Thomas Bernauer, 2019. "Effects of funding mechanisms on participation in multilateral environmental agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-18, February.
    10. Lei Xie & Shaofeng Jia, 2017. "Diplomatic water cooperation: the case of Sino-India dispute over Brahmaputra," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 677-694, October.
    11. Andy Thorpe & Catherine Robinson, 2004. "When goliaths clash: US and EU differences over the labeling of food products derived from genetically modified organisms," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 21(4), pages 287-298, January.
    12. Joana Carlos Bezerra & Jan Sindt & Lukas Giessen, 2018. "The rational design of regional regimes: contrasting Amazonian, Central African and Pan-European Forest Governance," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 635-656, October.
    13. Christopher Marcoux, 2009. "Institutional Flexibility in the Design of Multilateral Environmental Agreements," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 209-228, April.
    14. Thomas Bernauer & Anna Kalbhenn & Vally Koubi & Gabriele Spilker, 2013. "Is there a “Depth versus Participation” dilemma in international cooperation?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 477-497, December.
    15. Pradip Kumar Sarker & Lukas Giessen & Max Göhrs & Sohui Jeon & Minette Nago & Fredy David Polo-Villanueva & Sarah Lilian Burns, 2024. "The forest policy outputs of regional regimes: a qualitative comparative analysis on the effects of formalization, hegemony and issue-focus around the globe," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 449-467, September.
    16. Leonardo Baccini & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "Before ratification: understanding the timing of international treaty effects on domestic policies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 50278, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Francisco Santos-Carrillo & Luis A. Fernández-Portillo & Antonio Sianes, 2020. "Rethinking the Governance of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in the COVID-19 Era," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(18), pages 1-24, September.
    18. Azusa Uji, 2019. "Institutional diffusion for the Minamata Convention on Mercury," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 169-185, April.
    19. Johannes Urpelainen, 2010. "Enforcing international environmental cooperation: Technological standards can help," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 475-496, December.
    20. Pradip Kumar Sarker & Md Saifur Rahman & Lukas Giessen, 2019. "Regional economic regimes and the environment: stronger institutional design is weakening environmental policy capacity of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 19-52, February.

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