Managing correlated stock externalities: water taxes with a pinch of salt
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Cited by:
- Denis Claude & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2012.
"Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 35-66, February.
- Denis Claude & Charles Figuieres & Mabel Tidball, 2012. "Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments," Post-Print halshs-01226488, HAL.
- Anne-Sarah Chiambretto & Elsa Martin, 2020. "Water Quantity Management in a Heterogeneous Landscape with Farsighted Farmers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(3), pages 593-613, November.
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