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Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods

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  • Hampton, Jean

Abstract

There has been a persistent tendency to identify what is called “the freerider problem” in the production of collective (or public) goods with the prisoner's dilemma. However, in this article I want to challenge that identification by presenting an analysis of what are in fact a variety of collective action problems in the production of collective goods. My strategy is not to consult any intuitions about what the free-rider problem is; rather I will be looking at the problematic game-theoretic structures of various situations associated with the production of different types of collective goods, thereby showing what sorts of difficulties a community concerned with their voluntary production would face. I call all of these dilemmas free-rider problems because in all of them certain individuals find it rational to take advantage of others' willingness to contribute to the good in a way that threatens its production. Some readers may feel that the term ‘free-rider problem’ is so identified with the prisoner's dilemma that my extension of the term in this way “jars”; if so, I invite them to coin another word for the larger phenomenon. My aim is not to engage in linguistic analysis but to attempt at least a partial analysis of the complicated structure of collective good production.

Suggested Citation

  • Hampton, Jean, 1987. "Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 245-273, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:3:y:1987:i:02:p:245-273_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Urs Steiner Brandt & Anders Poulsen & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2024. "Toward a third-generation rational choice theory: the multiple player approach to collective action problems," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 23(1), pages 99-122, December.
    2. Ramzi Suleiman & David V. Budescu & Amnon Rapoport, 2001. "Provision of Step-Level Public Goods with Uncertain Provision Threshold and Continuous Contribution," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 253-274, May.
    3. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 245-278, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    4. Jonathan Anomaly, 2015. "Public goods and government action," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 14(2), pages 109-128, May.
    5. Cartwright, Edward & Stepanova, Anna, 2015. "The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 29-33.
    6. Dennis Chong, 1993. "Coordinating Demands for Social Change," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 528(1), pages 126-141, July.
    7. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 1998. "The constitutional dilemma of European integration," MPRA Paper 35437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Elinor Ostrom, 2003. "How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(3), pages 239-270, July.
    9. Federica Alberti & Edward J. Cartwright, 2016. "Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 205-233, January.
    10. A. Yudanov & O. Pyrkina & E. Bekker., 2016. "On the limits of unsolvability of the "free rider problem"," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
    11. Ido Erev & Amnon Rapoport, 1990. "Provision of Step-Level Public Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 401-425, September.
    12. Carlo Carraro, 1997. "Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 163-177, October.
    13. Anthony de Jasay, 1993. "Taxpayers, Suckers and Free Riders," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 117-125, January.
    14. Ramzi Suleiman, 1997. "Provision Of Step-Level Public Goods Under Uncertainty," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(2), pages 163-187, May.
    15. Mutti, Shadreck Mukanjo & Jourdain, Damien & Karuaihe, Selma Tuemumunu & Lundhede, Thomas Hedemark & Mungatana, Eric Dada, 2023. "Policies to reduce local participation in illegal hunting: The case of Kafue National Park in Zambia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    16. Jonathan C. Huefner & H. Keith Hunt, 1994. "Broadening the Concept of Entrepreneurship: Comparing Business and Consumer Entrepreneurs," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 18(3), pages 61-75, April.
    17. Goren, Harel & Kurzban, Robert & Rapoport, Amnon, 2003. "Social loafing vs. social enhancement: Public goods provisioning in real-time with irrevocable commitments," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 277-290, March.

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