IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/anname/v528y1993i1p126-141.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coordinating Demands for Social Change

Author

Listed:
  • DENNIS CHONG

Abstract

Mass protest movements resemble assurance games, in which individual decisions to contribute are contingent on the aggregate level of participation. While participation in ineffective movements carries high costs and returns few collective and selective benefits, participation in successful social movements can be more advantageous than abstention. Supporters of a movement therefore try to coordinate their decisions with those of other activists, participating when it appears that the movement has sufficient popular support to be politically effective, but not otherwise. Such decisions, however, typically have to be made with considerable uncertainty about both the intentions of other individuals and the prospects of the movement as it develops. Given this individual calculus, a number of deductions can be drawn about the resources, strategies, goals, and political conditions that will be required to coordinate and organize mass social protest.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Chong, 1993. "Coordinating Demands for Social Change," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 528(1), pages 126-141, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:528:y:1993:i:1:p:126-141
    DOI: 10.1177/0002716293528001010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716293528001010
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0002716293528001010?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. White, 1988. "Rational Rioters: Leaders, Followers, and Popular Protest in Early Modern Japan," Politics & Society, , vol. 16(1), pages 35-69, March.
    2. Hampton, Jean, 1987. "Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 245-273, October.
    3. Amartya K. Sen, 1967. "Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(1), pages 112-124.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 245-278, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. White, Thomas A. & Runge, C. Ford, 1992. "Common Property And Collective Action: Cooperative Watershed Management In Haiti," Working Papers 14377, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    3. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1998. "Culture, Circles, And Commercials," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(1), pages 47-75, February.
    4. Heinzel, Christoph & Winkler, Ralph, 2006. "Gradual versus structural technological change in the transition to a low-emission energy industry: How time-to-build and differing social and individual discount rates influence environmental and tec," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 09/06, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    5. A. Yudanov & O. Pyrkina & E. Bekker., 2016. "On the limits of unsolvability of the "free rider problem"," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
    6. Fleurbaey, Marc & Zuber, Stéphane, 2015. "Discounting, beyond utilitarianism," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 9, pages 1-52.
    7. Torsten Heinrich & Henning Schwardt, 2013. "Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, August.
    8. Rami S. Al-Gharaibeh & Mostafa Z. Ali, 2022. "Knowledge Sharing Framework: a Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 13(1), pages 332-366, March.
    9. Jean Tirole, 1981. "Taux d'actualisation et optimum second," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 32(5), pages 829-869.
    10. Jean-Robert Tyran & Thomas Markussen & Louis Putterman, 2011. "Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes," Vienna Economics Papers vie1103, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    11. Ertör-Akyazi, Pinar & Akçay, Çağlar, 2021. "Moral intuitions predict pro-social behaviour in a climate commons game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    12. Putterman, Louis, 1997. "On the past and future of china's township and village-owned enterprises," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(10), pages 1639-1655, October.
    13. Elsner, Wolfram, 2015. "Policy Implications of Economic Complexity and Complexity Economics," MPRA Paper 63252, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Carlisle Ford Runge, 1985. "The Innovation of Rules and the Structure of Incentives in Open Access Resources," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 67(2), pages 368-372.
    15. Koukoumelis, Anastasios & Levati, M. Vittoria & Weisser, Johannes, 2012. "Leading by words: A voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 379-390.
    16. Federica Alberti & Edward J. Cartwright, 2016. "Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 205-233, January.
    17. Luca Zarri, 2010. "On social utility payoffs in games: a methodological comparison between Behavioural and Rational Game Theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 587-598, October.
    18. Jaume Freire-Gonz lez & Ignasi Puig-Ventosa, 2015. "Energy Efficiency Policies and the Jevons Paradox," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 5(1), pages 69-79.
    19. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Schumacher, Jan, 2010. "Discounting and welfare analysis over time: Choosing the [eta]," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 372-385, September.
    20. Kaushik Basu, 2016. "Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9299.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:528:y:1993:i:1:p:126-141. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.