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Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences

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  • NORDSTRÖM, JONAS
  • THUNSTRÖM, LINDA
  • VAN ’T VELD, KLAAS
  • SHOGREN, JASON F.
  • EHMKE, MARIAH

Abstract

We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.

Suggested Citation

  • Nordström, Jonas & Thunström, Linda & Van ’T Veld, Klaas & Shogren, Jason F. & Ehmke, Mariah, 2023. "Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 83-114, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bpubpo:v:7:y:2023:i:1:p:83-114_4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Edenbrandt, Anna Kristina & Lagerkvist, Carl Johan & Nordström, Jonas, 2020. "Interested, indifferent or active information avoider of climate labels: Cognitive dissonance and ascription of responsibility as motivating factors," AgriFood-WP 2020:1, Lund University, AgriFood Economics Centre.
    2. Capitán, Tabaré & Thunstrom, Linda & van 't Veld, Klaas & Nordström, Jonas & Shogren, Jason F., 2024. "Show me the labels: Using pre-nudges to reduce calorie information avoidance," SocArXiv vy6af, Center for Open Science.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior

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