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Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions

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  • Tsebelis, George

Abstract

This article introduces a theory of Nested Games which accounts for the cohesion of coalitions. The parties in a coalition are considered to be playing a game with variable payoffs. The payoffs depend on a higher-order game between the coalition and its opponents. Several political situations approximate to this conceptualization, such as Government and Opposition coalitions, factions inside parties, international coalitions, class conflict. The theory of Nested Games predicts the cohesion of coalitions as a function of the relative size of both the coalitions and the partners within each coalition.The test case of the theory is the cohesion of French electoral coalitions in 1978. Empirical results corroborate the theory. All parties behave according to its predictions. Moreover, a difference in the way parties behave, according to whether the game is visible (by the electorate) or invisible, is discovered and explained.

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  • Tsebelis, George, 1988. "Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 145-170, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:18:y:1988:i:02:p:145-170_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Laurans, Yann & Mermet, Laurent, 2014. "Ecosystem services economic valuation, decision-support system or advocacy?," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 7(C), pages 98-105.
    2. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1991. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 277-304, July.
    3. Benz, Arthur & Scharpf, Fritz W. & Zintl, Reinhard, 1992. "Horizontale Politikverflechtung: Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 10, number 10.
    4. Jongryn Mo, 1994. "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 402-422, September.
    5. Zürn, Michael, 1989. "Geschäft und Sicherheit: das CoCom-Regime und Theorien über Kooperationen in den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," EconStor Research Reports 112665, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    6. Kjell Hausken, 1995. "Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 465-488, October.
    7. K.K. Kailash, 2014. "Institutionalizing a Coalitional System and Games within Coalitions in India (1996–2014)," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 2(2), pages 185-202, December.
    8. Benz, Arthur, 1991. "Mehr-Ebenen-Verflechtung: Politische Prozesse in verbundenen Entscheidungsarenen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    9. Kumar, Vikas, 2011. "Negotiating constitutions for political unions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-76, March.
    10. George Tsebelis, 1990. "Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 5-29, January.
    11. Zürn, Michael, 1989. "Das CoCom-Regime: zum Erklärungswert rationalistischer Theorien," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 105-149.
    12. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Problem of Connectedness," MPIfG Discussion Paper 90/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    13. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1989. "Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(2), pages 149-176, April.

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