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The Politics of Property Rights

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  • Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn

Abstract

The study of land tenure polarizes the field of development. Neoclassical scholars lobby for a move toward private property rights, while other economists and historians defend the maintenance of customary land tenure. I argue that the development scholars' focus on the structure of property rights obscures a more fundamental problem of land reform—that of enforcement. Property rights will not inspire individual investment and economic growth unless political institutions give the ruler of a local community or nation-state sufficient coercive authority to silence those who advocate an alternative, more distributionally favorable property rights system. At the same time, political institutions must force the ruler to establish a credible commitment to that property rights system. I illustrate this theoretical argument through an analysis of property rights institutions in Akyem Abuakwa, a traditional state in colonial Ghana.

Suggested Citation

  • Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn, 1995. "The Politics of Property Rights," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 867-881, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:04:p:867-881_09
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    Cited by:

    1. Taliercio, Robert Jr., 2004. "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 213-232, February.
    2. Congdon Fors, Heather & Olsson, Ola, 2007. "Endogenous institutional change after independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1896-1921, November.
    3. Asaaga, Festus A. & Hirons, Mark A., 2019. "Windows of opportunity or windows of exclusion? Changing dynamics of tenurial relations in rural Ghana," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Francisco M. Gonzalez, "undated". "The Use of Coercion in Society: Insecure Property Rights, Conflict and Economic Backwardness," Working Papers 2010-15, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 09 Sep 2011.
    5. Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2003. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 587, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    6. Sjöstedt, Martin & Linell, Amanda, 2021. "Cooperation and coercion: The quest for quasi-voluntary compliance in the governance of African commons," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    7. Asaaga, Festus A. & Hirons, Mark A. & Malhi, Yadvinder, 2020. "Questioning the link between tenure security and sustainable land management in cocoa landscapes in Ghana," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    8. Mwangi, Esther, 2007. "Subdividing the Commons: Distributional Conflict in the Transition from Collective to Individual Property Rights in Kenya's Maasailand," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 815-834, May.
    9. Akaateba, Millicent Awialie & Huang, Huang & Adumpo, Emile Akangoa, 2018. "Between co-production and institutional hybridity in land delivery: Insights from local planning practice in peri-urban Tamale, Ghana," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 215-226.
    10. Cai,Yongyang & Selod,Harris & Steinbuks,Jevgenijs, 2015. "Urbanization and property rights," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7486, The World Bank.
    11. Karel Zeman, 2018. "Analýza teorie vlastnických práv [Theory of Ownership Rights Analysis]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(1), pages 99-115.
    12. Mwangi, Esther, 2006. "Subdividing the commons: the politics of property rights transformation in Kenya's Maasailand," CAPRi working papers 46, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    13. Akee, Randall K. Q., 2006. "Checkerboards and Coase: Transactions Costs and Efficiency in Land Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 2438, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Sverker C. Jagers & Marina Povitkina & Martin Sjöstedt & Aksel Sundström, 2016. "Paradise Islands? Island States and Environmental Performance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-24, March.

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